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bumrnary: "* [JT) A necessary and sufficient condition is derived for the equivalence of information patterns in general games. (^"^Calling a general game essentially determinate if it has an equilibriuui point in pure strategies for every possible pay-off function, a necessary ana suf1icient condition for essential determinateness is derived in terms of the information pattern.
Introduction
In the first sections (1-5) we examine the equivalence of games in extensive form, using the model proposed by Kuhn ( 1 ) . There are several kinds of equivalence that might be explored, depending in part on what one considers reasonable methods of play. vVe are concerned with equivalence with respect to mixed strategies. A quite different notion of equivalence would be needed, for example, if the play were limited to behavior strategies. 1 The notion of equivalence we evolve is only distantly related to the idea of strategic equivalence introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern -( 5 p 245~2i».Ö) • They are concerned mainly with variations in the payoff function which leave a solution invariant; we shall be concerned with variations in the structure of a game in extensive form which lefve the major strategic properties of the game invariant irrespective of the pay-off function 2 ,
A complete treatment of equivalence under variations in the structure of a game in extensive form is not given, but only equivalence under variations in the pattern of information. Roughly speaking two information patterns for the same player are equivalent if they differ at a given position in the game only in the knowledge which that player has of his own previous moves.
'' cf. Kuhn ( 
1) g
The mode of approach is quite similar to tlu-t of Krental, Qulne, McKinsey ( 2 ), and our results may be considered as an extension to general games of their results for twoperson, zero-sum games.
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In the later sections, these results are applied to furnish a necessary and sufficient condition for a general game to have an equilibrium point in pure strategies independently of the particular pay-off function or of tl e particular probability distributions assigned to chance moves. .Ve call such games essentially determinate, since the question whether or not they will have an equilibrium point in pure strategies is completely determined by the information pattern alone.
The condition, which we have labelled effectively perfect information, is that at any move a player know all preceding moves of his opnonents, and know at least as much as his opponents knew when they made those moves. In the special case that there are no chance moves, this condition is simply that the game be equivalent with respect to information to a game of perfect information. 1 
Games in Extensive Form
We shall follow rather closely the definition of games in extensive form given by Kuhn, witn some minor notational modifications. ..,h (w)) delined on a designated subset W of K. P^. A set function p(a/,U), defined on Ut^l» V-1,2,...,m(U), 0 < pd/'.UJ < 1. When we ivish to indicate the dependency of f on these entities t we shall write* A>. ,__ ._^, von Neumann and Morgenstern first proved that perfect information is a sufficient condition for a two-person aero aym . ^j game to have a saddlepoint in pure strategies[(see 5^ S»c. tfjC Kuhn extended this result to equilibrium points"In purÄ "" strategies for general games. Shapley ( 4 ) gdve a necessary and sufficient condition for a saddlepoint in pure strategies for a restricted class of two-person zero sum g-mes which is similar to the condition for general p-nnes we pive below.
P-26 5 -3-r = r (K^.h.p) .
Rather than axioraatize this set of primitives, we shall follow Kuhn in giving them a fteometricsl interpretation.
K is a finite tree, embedded in an oriented Euclidean plane, with a distinguished vertex U . The set W of end points of K are called plays. the remaining vertices moves. (We shall sometimes call both plays and moves by the common name positions.) The unique unicursal path leading from 0 to a play w will also be called a play, and represented by w .
The m positions immediateljr succeeding a position x are indexed by positive integers -3/-' \ ,2 , . .. ,m where m depends on x. x^ will designate the -»^th position immediately following x. m(x) designates the total number of possible choices (alternative^ at x. The rank of x in K, i.e., the number of positions which preceed x, will be designated by r(x). D(x) (descendants of x) will represent the set of all positions that follow x, and D(^,x) the set which follow by the -j/'th alternative.
The information pattern *U, first partitions the moves of K into n-M exclusive subsets, and then further subdivides each of these subsets into information sets.
are those -i positions where player i "has the move". P * {P$ t Pi # ,., f P \ is called the player partition. At each x^UE*!!. , player i is informed that he is at one of the positions in U, For each information set U, the number of alternatives is the same for all positions in U, hence we can write m(Ll), the total number of alternatives available at any position in U. Information sets are further restricted by the rule that no information set intersects the same play more than once.
The set 'UQ is reserved for the "chance player", i.e., every x {. P© is a chance move. 'We allow U C"^ to contain more than one move; this furnishes a convenient way of identify^-ing the probability distributions at different chance moves. miuT every y. For UtlJo, 0 < p{-u>,U) < 1, /_ pCv'.U) -1. Hence for chance moves, p^.U) assigns a probability distribution over the rn possibilities. «ve set p^.x) = ptV^Uj, x£U, h is the pay-off function. To each play w it assigns an n-tuple of real numbers determining how much each player is to receive at that point» We shall call a pair {Kf]l) a game structure, and correspondingly (K/U) will be called the structure of P (K f *lL,h,p) . % will be called the information pattern for player i.
Definition 2» A pure strategy for player i is a function TT. (U) which maps each Ut*!!. onto a positive integer JS < m(U), (We shall sometimes also use Z 0 ., f* to denote pure strategies). We define the choice at a position x of a strategy
It is clear that a game structure (K, 6 *!) completely • determines the set of all possible pure strategies (as well as mixed and behavior strategies) for each personal player.
Note that our definition specifies strategies for the chance player as well as for the personal players. A chance strategy corresponds to von Neumann and Morgenstern's "umpire's choice." ( 5 p.£l>. an n-tuple of strategies, one for each personal player. It is clear that each rr determines a unique play w , which we will designate by w(n ). Let n (U) -n.(U) where UeltL and TT. is contained in 0 * We define w(n ) recursively. is substituted for n. in n*; i.e., if n* ■ ("o»
then TI*/^ = (n 0l nj ,... ,/^,... , n n ) . Definition 3« The expected oay-off ri(n) for an n-tuple of pure strategies n is defined as
In case w contains no chance moves, p(w) = 1; otherwise p{w) is the product of the probabilities of those alternatives at chance moves in w which lead to further members of w. Kote that p{w) depends only on phy/J) jUfluo and is independent of the strategies of oersonal olayers; however, the relation holds Lemma 4. S is an eauivalence relation for games.
Proof: Immediate from the definition (since the one-one oorrespondences and equality of pay-off are enuivalence relations).
Equivalence of Information Patterns
Definitions6 and 8 characterize a kind of enuivalence which is not very profound in the sens« that it depends on the pay-off functions and the particular Drobability distributions at chance moves, A more revealing analysis is afforded if we deal with eouivalences (to be called essential equivalences) that hold irresoective of the pay-off and probabilities at chance moves. for every n containing / ., but for some n' containing T-JIUTI'^Hln'// 0 -) . Let n.' be the strategy of t he i' th player in n'. By hypothesis there is a n. such that H(n) -Hln/n ') for every % containing n i ; in particular lUn'/^) = Ki«*).
But by hypothesis Hln'/^i) = H(nV^/Ä)| since n' contains 'i . Whence, the equivalence strategies S. in P(KfU.,h,p) for j+i corresoond one-for-one with the eauivalence strategies S.' in
We define a correspondence s. «* s.' by the rule: if n.Es. then n-'^s.* where TI.'-TI.. Clearly, if 1°. = ^ , then for every f.-fi., /P | . f « n.', whence the correspondence is one-one.
The eouality H(s) = H(s') for this set of correspondences follows immediately from the definition of ^ for strategies.
Necessity. Suppose that there is a n. in (K,*!^) such that there is no n.' in (K/TJ.') for which »1*%**, Then there is some h and p and some n containing n. such that H(n) + H(n/n '). This violates the assumption that {K JU)^ (K *U.'). Proof; Theorem 6 and corollary ifb.
Ran ark: The rather tedious route whereby we arrive at Theorem 6 and corollary 6a can be bypassed intuitively by the following heuristic discussion. Theorem 4, which is not used directly in the proof, Indicates that inflation is essentially a process of adding to a player's information at a given move, some further knowledge about his own previous moves (where this additional information has no implications for previous moves of other players.)
But if a player is proceeding according to a preformulated pure strategy, and has complete information about the structure of the f^ame, then at any move where it is his turn to play, his strategy
will tell him what previous moves he has made. Hence, information solely about his own previous moves is superfluous. Presumably, a player's memory of a strategy will be equally complete whether it results from a direct choice (pure strategy in the strict sense)
or from a prior selection of a pure strategy by some chance device (mixed strategy). However, it is clear that if the player is using behavior strategies -i.e. mixes by some chance selection at each of his moves -there is no guarantee that he will remember all previous selections. This is true particularly where a player is represented by a team of persons, each assigned to different information sets. For this reason -as is readily verifiable -theorem 6 does not hold for behavior strategies. there are two or more strategies that are essentially equivalent.
8, Essentially Determinate Games
In the preceeding sections we were guided by a more or less intuitive notion of enuivalence, based on the presumption that the normal form of a game completely exhausts the strategic possibilities, It would be desirable to base our investigations on a set of rules for playing a ^ame in a rational fashion. Unfortunately at present the rules for rational play can be considered as being in a satisfactory state only for one-person .and two-person zero-sum games.
There is, however, a form of weak solution for general games that has been suggested by Nash ( 3 ) which at least can be used for exploring some of the properties of information patterns, and which, in the zero-sum two-person case reduces to the accepted raini-max rule. This is the notion of eauilibrium point. Since we have defined only pure strategies above, we limit ourselves to equilibrium points in pure strategies. Strictly speaking, he proved something slightly different from this; but the step to showing essential determinateness is trivial, amounting, in fact, only to pointing out that both h and p can be chosen arbitrarily. Lemma 10 shows that in the tree C-, the transition frrm a set of subgames to a covering subgame involves only one player.
Theorem 7: A necessary and sufficient condition that (K, '[UJ be essentially determinate is that the complete inflation of (K, Tp have effectively perfect information.
Proof; Sufficiency. The restriction to the complete inflation of (K,*U) is required only for necessity. Hence, assume that (K,^UJ has effectively perfect information« We show sufficiency by exhibiting, for any h and p, a strat n-tuple n which is an equilibrium poilpl By a miniti C&C we mean one for which there is no C' such that Q|»C'
It is clear that a minimal C defines a one-person subgame.
To simplify notation, rather than writing f^/^v and rt * '
we will write \Z and n . At most one of x and y is in K(n). Let oC denote the one that is in K(n) and /5 denote the other. Then oC 0
